COA: Outrageous Assertions Tainted By Emotion Are Not Actionable Defamation
In Daniels v. Metro Magazine Holding Co., L.L.C., decided Sept. 19, the COA affirmed the dismissal of a libel action brought against Metro Magazine and its editor/publisher, Bernie Reeves. The upshot: factual assertions that malign a person in her trade or profession may not be actionable as defamation if the assertions are obviously tainted by the emotion or indignation of an outraged or frustrated writer/speaker.
The case was brought by an insurance claims adjuster for Progressive Insurance Co. who claimed that a Metro Magazine essay written by Reeves defamed her in her profession as an insurance adjuster. Reeves' essay was about a bad experience he had after his car was stolen. The thief crashed the car into a pole, causing the engine to catch on fire. Reeves contacted his insurer, Progressive, and dealt with plaintiff. According to Reaves' essay, plaintiff:
*accused him of stealing his own car;
*forbade him from seeing his car;
*undertook actions equivalent to those of the former Soviet security police;
*spoke to him in a sinister voice and in a Gestapo voice;
*would've taken him to the gas chamber had his insurance agent not prevented it;
*was a fascist.
A defamation action will not lie if the challenged statement can't reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about a person. Thus, an expression of opinion isn't actionable. Also, "rhetorical hyperbole" isn't actionable, even if the writer/speaker appears to make a factual assertion, because a reasonable reader/listener wouldn't take the assertion seriously. The COA ruled that many of Reeves' challenged statements obviously were either statements of opinion (e.g., that plaintiff spoke in a "sinister" or "Gestapo" voice) or hyperbole (e.g., that she intended to take him to a "gas chamber" or that her actions were equivalent to those of the "former Soviet security police"). Alluding to the frivolous tone of Reeves' piece, the court observed that Reeves' statement that plaintiff was a fascist was contradicted by Reeves' comparison of her to communists. (A reasonable reader, the court indicated, would know that someone can't be both a fascist and a communist!)
As for the remaining statements, most notably Reeves' assertions that plaintiff accused Reeves of stealing his own car and forbade him from seeing his car, the court recognized that these statements were factual assertions and provided a stronger basis for a libel claim. But the court concluded that "when the article is read as a whole, it is clear that Reeves' depiction of the processing of his claim is a highly individualized, personal interpretation tainted by his own emotions, rather than a journalistic, factual recounting of events." In the essay "Reeves is obviously disgruntled and frustrated by what he perceives to be Progressive's and plaintiff's negative attitudes towards his claim," and a "reasonable reader readily perceives that Reeves is highly sensitive and irrational regarding even the most basic of plaintiff's actions in processing his claim." His "obvious emotion and irrationality, combined with the absurd tone of the piece, greatly detract from his credibility and provide the reader with facts from which his or her own conclusions may be drawn." A reasonable reader, the COA said, would recognize Reeves' statements as an "expression of outrage" and discredit them as such. Common sense prevails. Thus, Reeves' assertions that plaintiff accused him of stealing his own car and forbade him from seeing his car were not actionable.
This case is important because defamation actions frequently arise from negative statements maligning products, companies, and business persons. Often the assertions are colored by emotion, outrage, and frustration. It will be interesting to see how broadly this decision is be applied.
The case was brought by an insurance claims adjuster for Progressive Insurance Co. who claimed that a Metro Magazine essay written by Reeves defamed her in her profession as an insurance adjuster. Reeves' essay was about a bad experience he had after his car was stolen. The thief crashed the car into a pole, causing the engine to catch on fire. Reeves contacted his insurer, Progressive, and dealt with plaintiff. According to Reaves' essay, plaintiff:
*accused him of stealing his own car;
*forbade him from seeing his car;
*undertook actions equivalent to those of the former Soviet security police;
*spoke to him in a sinister voice and in a Gestapo voice;
*would've taken him to the gas chamber had his insurance agent not prevented it;
*was a fascist.
A defamation action will not lie if the challenged statement can't reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about a person. Thus, an expression of opinion isn't actionable. Also, "rhetorical hyperbole" isn't actionable, even if the writer/speaker appears to make a factual assertion, because a reasonable reader/listener wouldn't take the assertion seriously. The COA ruled that many of Reeves' challenged statements obviously were either statements of opinion (e.g., that plaintiff spoke in a "sinister" or "Gestapo" voice) or hyperbole (e.g., that she intended to take him to a "gas chamber" or that her actions were equivalent to those of the "former Soviet security police"). Alluding to the frivolous tone of Reeves' piece, the court observed that Reeves' statement that plaintiff was a fascist was contradicted by Reeves' comparison of her to communists. (A reasonable reader, the court indicated, would know that someone can't be both a fascist and a communist!)
As for the remaining statements, most notably Reeves' assertions that plaintiff accused Reeves of stealing his own car and forbade him from seeing his car, the court recognized that these statements were factual assertions and provided a stronger basis for a libel claim. But the court concluded that "when the article is read as a whole, it is clear that Reeves' depiction of the processing of his claim is a highly individualized, personal interpretation tainted by his own emotions, rather than a journalistic, factual recounting of events." In the essay "Reeves is obviously disgruntled and frustrated by what he perceives to be Progressive's and plaintiff's negative attitudes towards his claim," and a "reasonable reader readily perceives that Reeves is highly sensitive and irrational regarding even the most basic of plaintiff's actions in processing his claim." His "obvious emotion and irrationality, combined with the absurd tone of the piece, greatly detract from his credibility and provide the reader with facts from which his or her own conclusions may be drawn." A reasonable reader, the COA said, would recognize Reeves' statements as an "expression of outrage" and discredit them as such. Common sense prevails. Thus, Reeves' assertions that plaintiff accused him of stealing his own car and forbade him from seeing his car were not actionable.
This case is important because defamation actions frequently arise from negative statements maligning products, companies, and business persons. Often the assertions are colored by emotion, outrage, and frustration. It will be interesting to see how broadly this decision is be applied.
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